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Dependency risk graphs have been proposed as a tool for analyzing cascading failures due
to critical infrastructure dependency chains. However, dependency chain analysis is not by
itself adequate to develop an efﬁcient risk mitigation strategy – one that speciﬁes which
critical infrastructures should have high priority for applying mitigation controls in order
to achieve an optimal reduction in the overall risk. This paper extends previous
dependency risk analysis research to implement efﬁcient risk mitigation. This is accom-
plished by exploring the relation between dependency risk paths and graph centrality
characteristics. Graph centrality metrics are applied to design and evaluate the effective-
ness of alternative risk mitigation strategies. The experimental evaluations are based on
random graphs that simulate common critical infrastructure dependency characteristics
as identiﬁed by recent empirical studies. The experimental results are used to specify an
algorithm that prioritizes critical infrastructure nodes for applying controls in order to
achieve efﬁcient risk mitigation.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
(Inter)dependencies between critical infrastructures are a key
factor in critical infrastructure protection because they may
allow a failure that is seemingly isolated in one critical
infrastructure to cascade to multiple critical infrastructures.
One way to analyze critical infrastructure dependencies is to
use dependency risk graphs whose nodes represent critical
infrastructures or components and directed edges represent
the potential risk that the destination node may suffer due toElsevier B.V. This is an o
).
jrc.ec.europa.eu (M. Theits dependency on the source node in the event of a source
node failure.
Kotzanikolaou et al. [7–9,14,15] have proposed a risk based
methodology for assessing the cumulative risk of dependency
risk paths – chains of critical infrastructure nodes that are
(inter)connected due to their (inter)dependencies. The meth-
odology uses as input existing risk assessment results from
critical infrastructure operators and, based on the ﬁrst-order
dependencies between critical infrastructures, assesses the
potential risk values of all the nth-order dependency riskpen access article under the CC BY license
ocharidou).
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paths, a risk assessor may identify the most critical depen-
dency chains by examining all potential dependency risk
paths with cumulative risk above a predeﬁned threshold.
Although the identiﬁcation of the most important depen-
dency chains is a key step towards efﬁcient risk mitigation,
certain open problems exist. A simple mitigation strategy is
to apply security controls at the root node of each critical
dependency chain. However, this may not always be a cost
effective strategy because the effects on some nodes may not
be measured properly. For example, consider the case where
a small subset of nodes (not necessarily the roots of critical
chains) affect a large number of critical dependency paths.
Decreasing the probability of failure of these nodes by
selectively applying security controls to them may result in
a greater overall risk reduction. Another example is when
nodes of high importance exist outside the most critical
dependency paths (such as nodes that simultaneously affect
many other nodes that belong to the set of most critical
paths, or nodes that affect the overall dependency risk of the
entire structure/graph).
Most current risk mitigation methodologies are empirical
in nature and typically focus on critical infrastructures that
initiate cascading failures (e.g., energy and information and
communications infrastructures). By studying actual large-
scale failures, it is clear that the two sectors often initiate
serious cascading effects in interdependent critical infra-
structures (e.g., the famous California blackouts of 2000 and
2001, and the Northeast Blackout of 2003). Nevertheless,
focusing on some sectors and on potential initiators may
not be suitable in every case. Therefore, the impact of each
dependency should be considered along with the position of
each critical infrastructure within the network of interdepen-
dent critical infrastructures.
The systematic identiﬁcation of the most important nodes
and the prioritization of nodes for applying security controls
can be complex tasks. The need for a high-level and efﬁcient
risk mitigation technique that considers multiple character-
istics of interdependent critical infrastructures is clear [3]. An
optimal risk mitigation methodology would help identify the
smallest subset of critical infrastructures that yields the
highest overall risk reduction in a risk graph, although the
candidate nodes may not initiate critical paths or may not
even belong to the most critical paths.
This paper explores the use of graph centrality metrics in
dependency risk graphs in order to prioritize critical infra-
structures when applying risk mitigation controls. Alternative
risk mitigation strategies are implemented algorithmically
and subsequently evaluated empirically using simulations.
The ultimate goal is to identify the minimum subset of
critical infrastructure nodes in a dependency risk graph
whose risk treatment (application of security controls) would
result in the maximum risk reduction in the entire graph of
interdependent critical infrastructures. The approach incor-
porates three key extensions: (i) data mining techniques to
identify correlations between centrality metrics and high
impact critical infrastructure nodes in a dependency risk
graph; (ii) optimum centrality metrics to develop and test
various risk mitigation strategies that maximize risk reduc-
tion; and (iii) analysis of nodes with high numbers of inbound(sinkholes) and outbound connections and the comparison of
their risk reduction results.
Experiments were conducted on hundreds of random
graphs with randomly selected dependencies in order to
validate the proposed mitigation strategies. The random
graphs were created to satisfy the constraints encountered
in real-world interconnected critical infrastructures. The
experimental results demonstrate the efﬁciency of the pro-
posed risk mitigation strategies. The mitigation strategies can
be used proactively to analyze interconnections in large-scale
interdependent infrastructures and pinpoint underestimated
or ignored infrastructures that are, in fact, critical to reducing
the overall risk.2. Building blocks
The proposed methodology has three building blocks:
(i) dependency risk graphs and a multi-risk dependency
analysis methodology for modeling cascading failures; (ii)
graph centrality metric based analysis of dependency risk
graphs; and (iii) feature selection techniques that help eval-
uate the effects of centrality metrics on risk mitigation. This
section brieﬂy describes the three building blocks.
2.1. Multi-risk dependency analysis methodology
A dependency is deﬁned as “the one-directional reliance of
an asset, system, network or collection thereof – within or
across sectors – on an input, interaction or other requirement
from other sources in order to function properly” [17]. The
methodology described in this paper extends the dependency
risk methodology of Kotzanikolaou et al. [7,8], which was
developed to analyze multi-order cascading failures.
2.1.1. First-order dependency risk
Kotzanikolaou et al. [7,8] initially consider ﬁrst-order depen-
dencies between critical infrastructures and go on to model
nth-order dependencies. Each dependency from a node CIi to a
node CIj is assigned an impact value Ii;j and likelihood value
Li;j of a disruption. Note that the impact and likelihood values
are assumed to be obtained from organization-level risk
assessments performed by critical infrastructure operators.
The product of Ii;j and Li;j is the dependency risk Ri;j of
infrastructure CIj due to its dependency on CIi. Dependencies
are visualized in a graph G¼ ðN;EÞ where N is the set of nodes
(or infrastructures or components) and E is the set of edges
(or dependencies). The graph is directional and a destination
critical infrastructure receives a risk from a source critical
infrastructure as a result of its dependence on the source
infrastructure.
2.1.2. Extension to nth-order dependency risk
Let CI¼ ðCI1;…;CImÞ be the set of all the considered critical
infrastructures. An algorithm proposed by Kotzanikolaou
et al. [7,8] examines each critical infrastructure as a potential
root node of a cascading effect. Let CIY0 denote a critical
infrastructure that is the root of a dependency chain and
CIY0-CIY1-…-CIYn denote the corresponding chain of
length n. Then, the algorithm computes the cumulative
i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f c r i t i c a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o t e c t i o n 1 0 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 4 – 4 436dependency risk of the nth-order dependency chain as
DRY0 ;…;Yn ¼
Xn
i ¼ 1
RY0 ;…;Yi 
Xn
i ¼ 1
∏
i
j ¼ 1
LYj 1 ;Yj
 !
 IYi 1 ;Yi ð1Þ
Informally, this equation computes the dependency risk
contributed by each affected node in the chain due to a
failure of the source node. The computation of the risk is
based on a risk matrix that combines the likelihood and the
incoming impact values of each node in the chain. Interested
readers are referred to [7] for additional details.
2.2. Graph centrality metrics
Graph centrality analysis attempts to quantify the position of a
node in relation to other nodes in a graph. In other words,
graph centrality metrics are used to estimate the relative
importance of a node in a graph. Several centrality metrics
have been speciﬁed, each measuring a different characteristic: Degree centrality: This metric measures the number of
edges attached to each node. Given a node u, the degree
centrality is deﬁned as CdðuÞ ¼ degðuÞ where deg(u) is the
total number of outbound and inbound edges of node u. Closeness centrality: This metric quantiﬁes the intuitive
central or peripheral placement of a node in a two-
dimensional region based on geodesic distances. It is
deﬁned as CcðuÞ ¼
P
8vAVðGÞδðu; vÞ where δðu;vÞ is the aver-
age shortest path between node u and any other node in
the graph. Betweenness centrality: This metric measures the number of
paths in which a node participates. It is deﬁned as
CbðuÞ ¼
P
ua ia jAVδijðuÞ where δijðuÞ ¼ σijðuÞ=σij. Note that
σijðuÞ denotes the number of geodesic distances from i to
j in which node u is present and σij is the number of
geodesic distances from i to j. Bonacich (eigenvector) centrality: This metric [2] measures the
inﬂuence of a node in a network as ciðα; βÞ ¼
P
jðαβciÞRi;j
where α is a scaling factor, β reﬂects the extent to which
centrality is weighted, R is the node adjacency matrix, I is
the identity matrix and l is the matrix of ones. An
adjacency matrix is an NN matrix with each element
assigned a value of one if an edge exists between the
corresponding nodes, and zero otherwise. Eccentricity centrality: This metric is similar to closeness
centrality. It corresponds to the greatest distance from
among all the shortest paths between a node u and other
nodes (based on geodesic distances).
2.3. Feature selection
Feature selection, also called variable selection or attribute
selection, is used in data mining for selecting attributes in a
data set that are most relevant to a predictive modeling
problem. Feature selection is critical for the effective analysis
of characteristics in data sets because they frequently contain
redundant information that is not necessary to build pre-
dictive models [11]. Removing non-informative terms accord-
ing to corpus statistics [19] increases both effectiveness and
efﬁciency.This work considers centrality metrics as potential fea-
tures in a dependency risk graph. A predictive model is used
to detect which features (i.e., centrality metrics) can be used
to characterize nodes that signiﬁcantly affect the cumulative
risk of dependency paths. Speciﬁcally, the model helps
identify the centrality metrics that are the most useful (i.e.,
provide the most information) about whether or not a critical
infrastructure node greatly affects the overall risk of a
dependency risk graph. Features (centrality metrics) are
ranked lower if they are common to the positive set (i.e.,
nodes with high impacts on risk paths) and the negative set
(i.e., nodes with low impacts on risk paths). Features are
ranked higher if they are effective discriminators for a class.
The feature selection tests described in this paper employ
two well-known measures, information gain and gain ratio.
Information gain [1] is a statistical measure that has been
successfully applied to feature selection in information
retrieval problems. Several researchers [4,16] have used this
approach for feature selection before training a binary classi-
ﬁer. The approach is used in this work to classify centrality
metrics that tend to appear often in nodes that greatly affect
the cumulative risk of dependency risk graphs.
Gain ratio is a variation of information gain. The differ-
ence is that the information gain measure prefers to select
attributes with large values [6]. Gain ratio overcomes this bias
by taking into consideration the statistical appearance of a
feature in the negative and positive sets (i.e., if a speciﬁc
centrality metric is rarely detected in dangerous critical
infrastructure nodes but is never found in safe nodes, then
it has a rather low information gain rank but a very high gain
ratio rank). The gain ratio measure is used to identify
centrality metrics and combinations of centrality metrics that
rarely appear in graphs, but signiﬁcantly affect the cumula-
tive risk in paths when they are present.3. Centrality metrics in dependency risk
graphs
This section explores the effects of centrality metrics on the
importance of nodes in dependency risk graphs. Note that the
edges in the graphs considered here denote directed risk
relations between nodes, not topological connections. Intui-
tively, nodes with high centrality measures are expected to
have high effects on the overall dependency risk. The ques-
tion that needs to be answered is: Which centrality metrics
have higher effects on risk propagation? Nodes with the
highest centrality values are good candidates for implement-
ing risk mitigation controls. The goal is to design an algo-
rithm that is capable of identifying these nodes and to use it
to articulate a cost-effective risk mitigation strategy.3.1. Analysis of centrality metrics
Each of the centrality metrics is considered in order to
analyze its effect on the overall risk in a dependency
risk graph.
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A node with high degree centrality has many dependencies.
Since the edges in a risk graph are directional, degree
centrality should be examined for two cases: Inbound degree centrality: This is the number of edges that
end at a node. A high inbound degree centrality indicates a
cascade resulting node [10]. Outbound degree centrality: This is the number of edges that
start at a node. A high outbound centrality indicates a
cascade initiating node [10].
Nodes with high inbound degree centrality in a risk graph
are natural “sinkhole” points of incoming dependency risk.
Nodes with high outbound degree centrality appear to be
suitable nodes to consider when prioritizing mitigation con-
trols. Indeed, if proper mitigation controls are applied to
these nodes, then multiple cumulative dependency risk
chains can be reduced simultaneously. This could be a very
cost-effective approach for applying controls to particular
high risk edges or high risk paths. Clearly, it is not guaranteed
that applying one or more security controls to a node with
high outbound degree centrality would positively impact
many (or all) outgoing dependency chains that involve the
node. However, it would be beneﬁcial if the mitigation
strategy could initially examine the possible security
controls.
3.1.2. Closeness centrality
Nodes with high closeness centrality have short average
distances from most nodes in a graph. In the case of a
dependency risk graph, nodes with high closeness centrality
tend to be part of many dependency chains; sometimes,
these nodes may even initiate dependency chains. Since
cascading effects tend to affect relatively short chains
(empirical evidence indicates that cascading failures rarely
propagate deeply [18]), intuitively, nodes with high closeness
centrality would have a greater effect on the overall risk of a
dependency chain than nodes with low closeness centrality.
To formalize this, consider Eq. (1) that computes the cumu-
lative risk of a dependency chain. The closer a node is to the
initiator of a cascading event, the more effect it would have
on the cumulative dependency risk because the likelihood of
its outgoing dependency would affect all the partial risk
values of subsequent dependencies (edges).
A more effective way to exploit closeness centrality in
mitigation decisions is to compute the closeness of every
node with respect to the subset of the most important
initiator nodes. Regardless of the approach that is used, the
a priori knowledge and intuition of risk assessors could be
leveraged. In general, risk assessors have an understanding of
which nodes are most important in cascading failure scenar-
ios. For example, empirical results show that energy nodes
and information and communications nodes are the most
common cascade initiators [18].
In addition, nodes with high outbound degree centrality
are likely to participate in multiple dependency risk chains.
Thus, it is possible to ﬁrst identify the subset of the most
important nodes with regard to cascading failures and thencompute the closeness of all other nodes with respect to this
subset of nodes as a secondary criterion for mitigation
prioritization.
3.1.3. Eccentricity centrality
Similar to closeness centrality, a node has higher eccentricity
centrality if it has a small maximum distance to every other
reachable node. The small maximum distance is computed
as the greatest distance from among all the shortest paths
between the node and all other nodes (based on geodesic
distances). If a critical infrastructure node has high eccen-
tricity, then all the other critical infrastructure nodes are
proximal to it.
3.1.4. Betweenness centrality
In a dependency risk graph, a node with high betweenness
centrality lies on a high proportion of dependency risk paths.
This means that, although the nodes may not be initiating
nodes of cascading failures (high outbound centrality) or may
not belong to a path with high cumulative dependency risk,
they tend to contribute to multiple risk paths and, therefore,
play an important role in the overall risk. Applying mitigation
measures to these nodes is likely to decrease the dependency
risk of multiple chains simultaneously.
Upon comparing closeness centrality with betweenness
centrality, it appears that closeness should precede between-
ness as a mitigation criterion. Although a node that is in
multiple paths will eventually affect multiple chains, it is
possible that such a node, because it tends to be at the end of
the chains, will not affect the cumulative dependency risks of
the chains (recall that nodes with high-order dependencies
are rarely affected by cascading failures).
3.1.5. Bonacich (eigenvector) centrality
A node with high Bonacich (eigenvector) centrality [2] is
adjacent to nodes with very high or very low inﬂuence,
depending on whether the parameter β is greater or less than
zero. In a risk dependency graph, nodes with high eigenvec-
tor centrality (when βr0) are of interest because these nodes
are connected to other nodes that also have high connectiv-
ity. This is an interesting measure for critical infrastructure
risk graphs as these nodes not only can cause cascading
failures to more nodes, but they can cause multiple cascading
chains of high risk. In contrast, a less connected node means
that it shares fewer dependencies with other nodes and is
only affected by speciﬁc nodes in the graph. This means that
applying mitigation measures to the node may not affect the
overall risk in a signiﬁcant manner. On the other hand, if
mitigation controls are applied to a node with high eigen-
vector centrality (when βr0), then the most powerful (or
critical) node is modiﬁed and this, in turn, affects several
other important nodes.
3.2. Classifying centrality metrics
In order to validate the intuitive analysis of centrality metrics in
dependency risk graphs presented in Section 3.1, feature selec-
tion from the discipline of data mining was used to empirically
study possible relations between the risk levels of nodes in
dependency paths (as assessed using the methodology of [8])
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ment was conducted to demonstrate how often nodes simul-
taneously appear in (i) the set of the most critical paths (i.e.,
paths with the highest cumulative dependency risk values);
and (ii) sets of nodes with the highest centrality values in a
dependency risk graph.
The experiment simulated graphs that were randomized
based on constraints proposed in empirical studies [10,18] in
order to resemble real critical infrastructure dependencies.
The following constraints were used: Occasional tight coupling: Some node relationships in the
dependency risk graph must have high impact values.
This was achieved by generating random risk values with
relatively high lower and upper impact and likelihood
bounds. Interactive complexity: Real-world critical infrastructure
dependencies have high interactive complexity. Infor-
mally, this implies that it is not possible to foresee all
the ways that things can go wrong. To achieve this, the
experiment constructed random graphs of 50 nodes with
high complexity; the critical paths up to fourth-order
dependencies had 230,300 to 2,118,760 possible chains. Number of dependencies: The experiment randomly simu-
lated critical infrastructure nodes with one to seven
connections (dependencies). Path length: The experiment used critical paths with
lengths of three to four hops. Number of initiators: The experiment used graphs in which
more than 60% of the nodes acted as initiators.Table 1 – Weka output ranking using information gain.
Information gain Inbound test Outbound test
Betweenness 0.259 0.277
Eccentricity 0.238 0.285
Closeness 0.387 0.345
Eigenvector 0.151 0.260
Intersection of all centralities 0.176 0.248
Inbound degree (sinkholes) – 0.302
Outbound degree 0.281 –Connectivity of initiators: The experiment used initiator nodes
that tended to have higher connectivity than other nodes.
The experiment used the Weka tool (version 3.6). All the
simulations were conducted using the information gain and gain
ratio based feature selection algorithms in Weka. Weka's Attri-
bute Selection Ranker was employed to rank the output results.
3.3. Feature selection results
The data set employed in the experiment comprised 32,950
nodes extracted from about 700 graphs containing about
774,015,270 paths. Dependency graphs were created accord-
ing to the aforementioned constraints. Feature selection
algorithms were then used to detect correlations between
high centrality metrics and critical infrastructure nodes that
greatly affect the overall risk.
Weka's output rankings provide insights into how high
centrality features characterize dangerous nodes that affect
the risks of the top critical paths. The results of two sets of
tests, inbound tests and outbound tests, are presented
in Tables 1 and 2; the inbound tests used inbound degree
centrality measures while the outbound tests used outbound
degree centrality measures. Table 1 shows the results using
information gain while Table 2 shows the results using gain
ratio. Note that the two highest values in the inbound and
outbound tests are highlighted using a bold font.
The Weka results provide valuable information about how
nodes with high centrality values affect dependency risk graphs: The number of critical paths with at least one node with a
high centrality metric is very high. An average of 74.4% of
the most critical paths in all the generated graphs con-
tained a node with at least one high centrality metric. This
percentage increased dramatically to 99.9% for the top 10%
of most critical paths, which leads to the conclusion that
the top 10% of paths frequently pass through the same
nodes as the top 1% of paths. When even larger sample
sets (with more than 10% of critical paths) were analyzed,
almost all the nodes with high centrality were found to
belong to a critical path. The gain ratio results demonstrate that critical infrastruc-
ture nodes with high values for all the centrality metrics
rarely appear in graphs but, when the nodes do appear,
they deﬁnitely affect the cumulative risk of critical paths.
Thus, critical infrastructure nodes with high values for all
the centrality metrics are of high importance. Nodes with high closeness centrality appear to be the best
critical infrastructure node candidates. However, the results
clearly show that all the centrality metrics are useful
indicators of important critical infrastructure nodes (the
information gain is above 20% for all the features). Therefore,
all the centrality metrics must be considered in each graph. Nodes with high closeness and/or degree centrality, both
outbound and inbound (sinkholes), tend to mitigate high
amounts of risk. An average of 49.6% of all dangerous nodes
tested had high closeness centrality values and an average
of 45% of the nodes had high degree centrality values. Risk mitigation is highly dependent on the graph being
considered. For example, in graphs containing nodes that
act as single points of failure, high centrality values are
excellent indicators of important critical infrastructure
nodes. However, in graphs containing nodes with equal
degrees, the identiﬁcation of nodes for risk mitigation is
often less successful. Fortunately, critical infrastructure
dependencies tend to have speciﬁc structural character-
istics [10,18] and these characteristics can be leveraged to
identify nodes for risk mitigation.4. Risk mitigation algorithm
The experimental results demonstrate that even if nodes
with high centrality are only a small fraction of the nodes in
the most critical risk paths, they still affect all the critical
paths greatly. Additionally, the feature analysis results sug-
gest that, depending on the graph being analyzed, all the
centrality metrics can play important roles. Thus, it is
essential for a risk mitigation strategy to take into
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(e.g., high closeness values) as well as the distinctive features
of each graph and choose the correct combination of cen-
trality metrics to identify the nodes for applying risk mitiga-
tion controls.
Algorithm 1. Decision-tree traversal using information gain
to select nodes for risk mitigation.
Procedure choosingNodeSubsets ðC; IGcðDÞ;N;DÞ
Inputs
High centrality subsets: C¼ fCC;CI;CB;CEg;CEg
Head set of all nodes: N
Number of nodes to be chosen from D: PERCENT
Subset of dangerous nodes: DN
Information gain of a centrality subset c over D: IGc(D)
Output
Percentage of nodes from D
0 N for risk mitigation
Step 1 – Start:
Mark all sets in C as unused
Position at the root node
Step 2 – Leaf:
If C is empty then
Output top nodes from D with highest centrality
END
else
if IGcðDÞ ¼ 0 8cAC then
Output top nodes from D with highest centrality
END
end if
end if
Step 3 – Decide case:
if nodes in DoPERCENT then
Go to Step 4
else
Go to Step 5
end if
Step 4 – Backtrack:
if at the root then
STOP
else
Return to the node above the current node
Choose different cAC
Go to Step 3
end if
Step 5 – Decision:
if IGc1 ðDÞ ¼ IGc2 ðDÞ 8c1; c2AC then
Select the leftmost c from C
else
Calculate information gain IGc(D) 8cACTable 2 – Weka output ranking using gain ratio.
Gain ratio Inbound test Outbound test
Betweenness 0.08 0.101
Eccentricity 0.08 0.101
Closeness 0.14 0.120
Eigenvector 0.06 0.09
Intersection of all centralities 0.458 0.550
Inbound degree (sinkholes) – 0.103
Outbound degree 0.101 –Select c from C with the highest IGc(D)
end if
N’N c
D’D c
C’Cfcg
Go to Step 2
end procedure
These results are incorporated in a node selection algo-
rithm for efﬁcient risk mitigation (Algorithm 1). The heuristic
algorithm recursively chooses the best set of nodes by limit-
ing its selection options until it reaches a set of selected
nodes of a predeﬁned size.
4.1. Modeling feature selection results as algorithm
restrictions
Three observations were made in Section 3.3: (i) nodes with
high values for all the centrality metrics always affect the
overall risk of a graph; (ii) nodes with high closeness and
betweenness centralities appear to have greater impacts than
nodes with high values for the other metrics; and (iii) nodes
with high values for more centrality metrics tend to have
higher impacts on a risk graph. Taking these observations
into account, the following steps are incorporated in the
dynamic node selection algorithm for risk mitigation:1. Model deﬁnition: Deﬁne the subsets of nodes with the
highest values for each centrality metric and compute
their information gain over the entire node set.2. Setup: Pre-compute all the centrality metric values for each
node in the graph. Using the centrality values, generate all
the high centrality subsets. These subsets act as features
for feature selection. In addition, pre-compute all the
dependency risk paths in the graph and sort them accord-
ing to their weights (total cumulative risk value of
each path).3. Using decision trees and information gain for node selection:
Deﬁne the information gain method and use it to split the
node sets.4. Traversing a decision tree using information gain splits: Tra-
verse a decision tree and select the optimal subset of
nodes to apply risk mitigation controls.
4.1.1. Model deﬁnition
Let CA denote the subset of top X% of nodes with the highest
centrality values for all the centrality sets, CE denote the subset
of the top X% of nodes with the highest eccentricity centrality,
CC denote the subset of the top X% of nodes with the highest
closeness centrality, CI denote the subset of the top X% of nodes
with the highest inbound degree centrality (sinkholes), CB
denote the subset of the top X% of nodes with the highest
betweenness centrality, and CEg denote the subset of the top X%
of nodes with the highest eigenvector centrality.
Let N denote the set of nodes in a risk graph. Let DN
denote the subset of nodes that participate in the top 20
critical risk paths in the graph. Finally, let IGx(N) denote the
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node set N. For example, IGB(N) denotes the information gain
when using high betweenness centrality as a feature of set N.
Information gain values were calculated for each central-
ity feature subset separately. The high centrality subset Cx
with the highest information gain over N is deemed to have
the most impact on the risk graph in comparison with the
other high centrality subsets.
For example, in a sample dependency risk graph, there
may exist nodes that act as initiators of cascading events in
the three most critical paths (i.e., critical paths with the
highest cumulative dependency risk values). However, nodes
that have less inﬂuence on the top three most critical paths
also exist, and these nodes may affect the overall risk of the
entire dependency risk graph more than the aforementioned
initiators. The risk mitigation algorithm is designed to select
these nodes over the three initiator nodes because it uses the
information gain values of all the high centrality node
subsets.4.1.2. Setup
The centrality metric values of each node are pre-computed
along with all the dependency risk paths in the graph. For
each centrality metric, the algorithm uses the pre-computed
centrality values and creates subsets CE;CC;CI;CB and CEg.
Next, the algorithm computes all the risk paths in the
graph and sorts them according to their total accumulated
risk values. All the outputs are used as input to the risk
mitigation algorithm, which selects the most effective nodes
for risk mitigation.4.1.3. Using decision trees and information gain for node
selection
A decision can be made (and a decision tree traversed) by
creating a split of the head set of critical infrastructure nodes
N to yield smaller subsets (graph leaves). Given a dependency
risk graph, the algorithm selects the centrality node subset
with the highest impact on the graph. Then, it outputs a new
subset that is the intersection of the selected subset with the
original set. This process is repeated for each derived subset
in a recursive manner called recursive partitioning. The
recursion is completed when the information gain calculation
at a speciﬁc point in the decision tree produces the same
information gain value for the target subset of nodes, or
when splitting no longer adds information to the prediction.
Algorithm 1 deﬁnes a sequence of high centrality subsets
that act as features. The risk mitigation algorithm investi-
gates this sequence to rapidly narrow down the group of
critical infrastructure nodes with the highest impacts on the
dependency risk graph. The feature selection increases the
effectiveness and efﬁciency of the algorithm because it
removes non-informative critical infrastructure nodes based
on the corpus statistics [19].4.1.4. Traversing a decision tree using information gain splits
The risk mitigation strategy can be simpliﬁed by always
choosing the subset of nodes with the highest information
gain at each step in the decision tree.Assume that a dependency risk graph has all the centrality
metric values calculated and all the high centrality subsets
speciﬁed. Then, Algorithm 1 would run as follows: Step 1: Find the centrality feature that yields the most
information gain for the root set of nodes DN. The
information gain is calculated for all four high centrality
subsets (features):
○ IGC(D)¼0.246 (Gain of closeness subset over D).
○ IGB(D)¼0.029 (Gain of betweenness subset over D).
○ IGS(D)¼0.051 (Gain of sinkholes subset over D).
○ IGEg(D)¼0.151 (Gain of eigenvector subset over D).
○ IGE(D)¼0.048 (Gain of eccentricity subset over D).The high closeness centrality subset has the highest
information gain, so it is used as the decision attribute
in the root set D. From here on, D
0
is the subset D \ CC of
nodes and N becomes the N \ CC subset.
 Step 2: Determine the feature that is tested in the second
branch. Since CC is already used as the root, it is only
necessary to consider the remaining four centrality sub-
sets, betweenness, sinkholes, eigenvector and eccentricity:
○ IGB(D)¼0.246
○ IGEg(D)¼0.029
○ IGS(D)¼0.051
○ IGE(D)¼0.000In this step, the betweenness centrality subset has the
highest information gain, so it is used as the decision
node. From here on, D
0
is the subset D \ CB of nodes and N0
becomes the N \ CB subset.
 Steps 3 to N: The process is repeated until all the nodes are
classiﬁed and D has three nodes remaining, or the algo-
rithm runs out of centrality attributes.
5. Algorithm validation
This section empirically analyzes the efﬁciency of the risk
mitigation algorithm (Algorithm 1) presented in Section 4. A
total of 2000 random experiments were conducted. In each
experiment, a graph containing up to 50 nodes was generated
based on the constraints described in Section 3.2.5.1. Efﬁciency analysis
The previous results have shown that centrality measures
can indeed characterize the important critical infrastructure
nodes that signiﬁcantly affect the overall risk in a depen-
dency risk graph. To evaluate the effectiveness of the pro-
posed risk mitigation strategy, it is necessary to emulate the
implementation of mitigation controls in the nodes identiﬁed
as being important (i.e., dangerous) by Algorithm 1. Examples
of controls are the repair prioritization of nodes (i.e., which
node to send a repair crew ﬁrst), increase in asset redundancy
at a node, or any other control that reduces the consequences
and/or likelihood of failure.
The experiments emulated the implementation of mitiga-
tion controls at a node CIi by reducing the likelihood value Li;j
of cascading failure from node CIi to node CIj for all nodes CIj
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of all the dependencies originating from CIi were reduced by
20%. To assess the result of applying risk mitigation controls
on each selected subset of nodes from a graph, the depen-
dency risk values were computed before and after the
implementation of risk mitigation, and the corresponding
risk reduction was computed in each case.
The efﬁciency of the proposed risk mitigation algorithm
was assessed by calculating the percentage risk reductions in
the graphs based on the aforementioned emulation of miti-
gation controls. The effects on three risk metrics were
examined using Algorithm 1: (i) risk reduction achieved for
the most critical path; (ii) risk reduction achieved for the sum
of the risks of the top 20 paths with the highest cumulative
dependency risks; and (iii) risk reduction achieved for the
sum of the risks of all graph paths. Only acyclic paths were
considered to reduce overlap. For example, if a high risk path
was cyclic, its acyclic part would most likely also be a high
risk path. Thus, the computation of cyclic paths was avoided
in the experiments.
Mitigation controls were implemented on three out of the
50 critical infrastructure nodes in each experiment. These
corresponded to 6% of the nodes in the entire graph.5.1.1. Effect on the most critical path
An average risk reduction of 12.1% was achieved when using
Algorithm 1 to select critical infrastructure nodes for imple-
menting mitigation controls. The highest risk reduction
achieved over all the experiments was 43.7%, where almost
half the risk of the most critical path was mitigated. This risk
mitigation was the highest achieved from among all the
mitigation strategies tested. A more thorough comparison
of the results is provided later in this section.
As shown in Fig. 1, no risk reduction in the most critical
path was achieved in about 25% of the experiments (498 out
of 2000). This is not a big concern because the goal is to
reduce the overall risk of the dependency risk graph and not
necessarily the risks of the nodes in the most critical path,
which are easily identiﬁed. Note, however, that when mitiga-
tion controls were applied to the nodes in the most critical
path, the algorithm achieved better risk reduction results
than when using well-known mitigation strategies such as
implementing controls at the initiator node in the most
critical path.Fig. 1 – Risk reduction for the most critical path.5.1.2. Effect on the top 20 risk paths
Fig. 2 shows that the highest risk reduction of 37.5% was
achieved for the sum of all the risk values derived from the
top 20 critical paths. The average risk reduction achieved in
the graphs using the algorithm was 9.8%. In addition, note
that only 12 graphs out of 2000 had structures that prevented
the algorithm from achieving any risk reduction in the top 20
paths. Speciﬁcally, 99.6% of the algorithm applications
achieved some risk mitigation and 47.3% of the applications
achieved high risk reduction (10% or more).
These are interesting results. The top 20 most critical
paths comprised 1000 nodes in each experiment. Although
the paths share critical infrastructure nodes, being able to
choose only three out of 50 nodes for risk mitigation in 20
paths is far more complex than choosing the correct nodes
only in the most critical path comprising ﬁve nodes. Again,
the algorithm had the best performance for the three differ-
ent mitigation strategies tested.
By monitoring algorithm execution and the critical infra-
structure node choices, it was possible to validate some
feature analysis results. In particular, the risk mitigation
algorithm mostly chooses critical infrastructure nodes with
high values for all the centrality metrics (i.e., the intersection
of all the high centrality sets for all the centrality metrics).
The second most frequent combination of centrality types
was nodes with high degree centrality (e.g., sinkholes) and
high closeness centrality.5.1.3. Effect on the entire dependency risk graph
Finally, the efﬁciency of the algorithm was analyzed when
attempting to reduce the risk in the entire risk graph, not just
for the top 20 paths. To accomplish this, the risk mitigation
achieved using the node selection algorithm was evaluated
for the sum of all the paths in the dependency graphs. Fig. 3
shows the results for 2000 experiments. The highest risk
reduction achieved was 12.2% with an average risk reduction
of 7.5% over all 2000 experiments. Interestingly, in 86.4% of
the experiments, the risk reduction achieved was between 5%
and 10% with an average of around 8.7%. Given the low
dispersion of the results, statistical probability suggests that
the algorithm output shows strong signs of uniformity and
homogeneity. Again, the algorithm had the best performance
of the three mitigation strategies tested.Fig. 2 – Risk reduction for the top 20 critical paths.
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This section compares the results obtained using the risk
mitigation algorithm (Algorithm 1) with the results obtained
using alternative mitigation mechanisms. The two alterna-
tive mitigation mechanisms used are based on well-known
scenarios.
5.2.1. Using initiators from the most critical paths
The ﬁrst strategy is based on the notion that initiator nodes
are critical points of failure in dependency risk chains. The
ﬁrst alternative mitigation strategy is to implement mitiga-
tion controls in critical infrastructure nodes that initiate
critical dependency paths. Thus, in the experiments, three
out of the 50 critical infrastructure nodes (6% of the nodes in
the graph) were chosen as initiators of the corresponding top
three critical paths.
5.2.2. Using nodes with high degree centrality (sinkholes and
outbound)
The second strategy is based on the commonly held notion
that critical infrastructure nodes with high inbound and
outbound degree centrality values (i.e., nodes with larger
numbers of incoming and/or outgoing connections) signiﬁ-
cantly affect dependency risk paths. For this reason, the
second mitigation strategy chooses the top 6% of nodes with
the highest inbound and outbound degree centrality values to
apply mitigation controls.
5.2.3. Comparison results
Table 3 shows the results obtained using all the mitigation
strategies. The highest values achieved are highlighted using
a bold font. Clearly, the decision making algorithm usingFig. 3 – Risk reduction for the complete set of paths.
Table 3 – Comparison of mitigation strategy results.
Risk metrics Information gain strategy
Most critical path 43.7% (max)
12.1% (avg)
Top 20 critical paths 37.5% (max)
9.8% (avg)
Entire graph 12.2% (max)
7.5% (avg)information gain yields the best results. Using the top
initiators strategy yields a higher average reduction risk for
the top 20 critical paths, albeit only marginally.
5.3. Implementation details
All the experiments were performed using a computer with
an Intel Core i-7, 2.7 GHz processor with four cores and 16 GB
RAM. An automatic dependency risk graph generator was
written in Java to test the proposed risk mitigation strategies.
The program randomly generates risk graphs and executes
the mitigation algorithms on the generated graphs. Also, it
computes the risk reduction percentage achieved using each
of the mitigation mechanisms.
The Neo4j graph database [12] was used to implement the
dependency analysis modeling tool due to its adaptability,
scalability and efﬁciency [5,13]. Neo4j builds on the property
graph model; nodes may have various labels and each label
can serve as an informational entity. Nodes are connected via
directed, typed relationships, and nodes and relationships
can hold arbitrary properties (key-value pairs). Neo4j facil-
itates the representation of thousands of dependent critical
infrastructures in a weighted, directed graph. The developed
application is standalone: it creates a random dependency
risk graph using the aforementioned constraints to model
real-world critical infrastructure dependencies. It then pre-
calculates all the necessary graph data and executes the
selected risk mitigation algorithm. When an algorithm com-
pletes its execution, it outputs the percentage of risk reduc-
tion achieved in the dependency risk graph.6. Conclusions
The methodology presented in this paper extends the depen-
dency risk methodology of Kotzanikolaou et al. [7,8] by
engaging graph centrality measures. The centrality measures
are used as additional criteria to identify the critical infra-
structure nodes in a dependency risk graph that signiﬁcantly
affect the critical risk paths in the graph and are, therefore,
good candidates for applying mitigation controls. The results
of the feature selection algorithms conﬁrm that the most
critical paths in a dependency risk graph tend to involve
nodes with high centrality values. However, several centrality
metrics are available and they contribute to node selection
and overall risk mitigation in various degrees. For this reason,
numerous simulation experiments were conducted to deter-
mine the best metrics and combinations of metrics. TheTop initiators strategy Top sinkholes strategy
38.4% (max) 34.5% (max)
11.8% (avg) 10.3% (avg)
28.7% (max) 29.8% (max)
10.0% (avg) 7.3% (avg)
10.1% (max) 10.8% (max)
5.3% (avg) 6.7% (avg)
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centrality sets to identify nodes with high overall centrality
values yields a good, and intuitively appealing, mitigation
strategy. Another result is that critical infrastructure nodes
with high closeness and degree centrality values appear to
have the highest impact on the overall risk of a dependency
risk graph.
Still, simply choosing nodes from these sets is not always
a viable choice because some dependency graphs may have
no nodes in speciﬁc high centrality sets or there may be
practical reasons that inhibit the application of controls at
these nodes. For this reason, a risk mitigation mechanism
was developed. The mechanism uses a decision tree built
from node subsets with high centrality values extracted from
a graph. The information gain approach is then used to
choose subsets of high centrality nodes that best characterize
the graph, enabling the dynamic identiﬁcation of the best
high centrality nodes for overall risk mitigation.
The risk mitigation algorithm achieved an average mitiga-
tion of 9.8% and maximum of 37.5% for the top 20 critical
paths in more than 99% of the risk dependency graphs tested.
The average risk mitigation achieved for entire graphs was
7.5% and the maximum mitigation was 12.2%. The risk
mitigation achieved for the most critical path was higher
than all the other mitigation mechanisms tested (43.7%).
However, not all experiments were successful in mitigating
the risk of the most critical path – in about 25.6% of the
graphs tested, the algorithm did not mitigate any risk. This is
understandable because the goal of the algorithm is to
pinpoint critical infrastructure nodes that impact the entire
dependency graph, not just the most critical path.
The methodology has certain limitations. If the goal is to
protect critical infrastructure nodes in the most critical path,
then mitigation controls should be applied at the initiator
node (and, if affordable, to the second and third nodes in the
path). While this approach guarantees maximum risk mitiga-
tion in every possible scenario, the large number of experi-
ments in which the mitigation approach did not lower the
overall risk prevents it from being applied exclusively to the
most critical path of a graph. This is because the algorithm
focuses on critical infrastructure nodes that affect the entire
risk dependency graph, not just a single path.
However, if the focus is on mitigating the cumulative risk
of a percentage of the top critical paths in a dependency risk
graph, then, in almost every case tested, the information gain
approach is more efﬁcient than manually choosing nodes.
This result holds for all three mitigation mechanisms eval-
uated in this research.
The single biggest advantage of the risk mitigation algo-
rithm is that it can identify critical infrastructure nodes that
may not be in the top critical path, but still signiﬁcantly affect
the overall risk in a dependency graph. While the exhaustive
computation of the complete set of dependency risk paths
may provide useful information and reveal critical infrastruc-
ture nodes that are underestimated or ignored, risk assessors
can use the algorithm to examine complex scenarios where
the manual selection of nodes for mitigation controls is
infeasible.
A key limitation of the methodology is its reliance on data
from previous critical infrastructure risk assessments. This isan inherent problem in all empirical risk approaches because
they analyze dependencies based on previous incidents.
However, critical infrastructure coordinators and regulators
often collect data related to speciﬁc sectors such as energy
and information and communications. National critical infra-
structure protection agencies as well as some critical infra-
structure asset owners and operators are also beginning to
collect data that can be used in risk assessment methodolo-
gies such as the one presented in this paper.Acknowledgments
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